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Cohabitation between unrelated individuals has become a socially
acceptable living arrangement in today's society. This development
has given rise to many problems in the area of zoning restrictions,
particularly since the United States Supreme Court in Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas I upheld the constitutionality of a village ordinance
which placed "zoning" limitations on the number of unrelated individuals who may share a single-family residence. 2 In the aftermath
of the Belle Terre decision, many commentators criticized the Court's
holding as sanctioning the violation of individual privacy rights. a The
Supreme Court of New Jersey, in State v. Baker, 4 acknowledged the
constitutional dangers posed by such restrictions and struck down a
similar ordinance as violative of the New Jersey State Constitution. 5
Dennis Baker was the owner and co-resident of a single-family
dwelling unit located in Plainfield, New Jersey. 6 Residing with
Baker were his wife, three daughters, and a Mrs. Conata and her
three children. 7 The defendant termed the living arrangement an

1 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
2 Id. at 7-10. The word "family" was defined in the challenged ordinance as follows:
[O]ne or more persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage, living and cooking
together as a single housekeeping unit .... A number of persons but not exceeding two (2) living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit though not
related by blood, adoption, or marriage shall be deemed to constitute a family.
Id. at 2 (quoting The Building Zone Ordinance of the Village of Belle Terre, Art. 1, § 1.35a
(June 8, 1970)).
3 Note, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas: "A Sanctuary for People," 9 U.S.F.L. REv. 391
(1974); Note, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas: Belle Terre is a Nice Place to Visit-But Only
"Families" May Live There, 8 URB. L. ANN. 193 (1974).
4 81 N.J. 99, 405 A.2d 368 (1979).
5 Id. at 112, 405 A.2d at 374. The court in Baker stated that:
state courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the full protections of
the federal Constitution. State Constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties,
their protections often extending beyond those required by the [United States] Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law. Constitutional decisions by federal
courts . . . should only be considered as 'guideposts' in interpreting state constitutional provisions....
Id. at 112 n.8, 405 A.2d at 374 n.8 (quoting Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977)).
6 81 N.J. at 103, 405 A.2d at 370. Baker's home was in an area zoned for single family use.
Id.
7 Id. at 104, 405 A.2d at 370.
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"extended family"'8 arising out of the group's common religious beliefs. 9 The "family" ate together, shared common areas, and held
communal prayer sessions. 10 In 1976, on three separate occasions,
Baker was charged with violations of a Plainfield zoning ordinance
"which [sought] to preserve the 'family' character of the municipality's
neighborhoods by prohibiting more than four unrelated individuals
from sharing a single housing unit."'
Baker was convicted in the Plainfield Municipal Court. 12 He
was again found in violation of the ordinance -after a trial de novo by
the Union County' Court. 13 The Appellate Division reversed the decision of the county' court 14 and subsequently, in State v. Baker, the
Supreme Court of' New Jersey affirmed.

15

Basing its decision on the

right of privacy and the due process provisions of the New Jersey
State Constitution, the court held that "municipalities may not condi-

tion residence upon the number of unrelated persons present within
the household." 16

s An "extended" falnily encompasses all members of a family who are blood related. It may
include aunts, uncles, cousins. grandparents, etc. There is no limit on the distance of blood

relation. Note, "'Burningthe House to Roast the Pig": Unrelated Individuals and Single Family
Zoning's Blood Relation Criterion. 58 CORNELL L. (1). 138, 157 n. 103 (1972).
9 81 N.J. at 104, 405 A.2d at 370. Baker, an ordained minister, maintained that the individuals' religious beliefs and consequent desire to go through life as "brothers and sisters"
necessitated this living arrangement. Id.
1o Id. Each occupant contributed a fixed amount per week for household expenses. Several
other persons also resided within the household for indeterminate periods of time. Id.
iId.
at 103, 405 A.2d at 370. Plainfield's zoning ordinance defined family as:
One (1) or more persons occupying a dwelling unit as a single non-profit housekeeping unit. More than four (4) persons . . . not related by blood, marriage, or adoption shall not be considered to constitute a family.
Id. at 104, 405 A.2d at 370 (quoting City of Plainfield Zoning Ordinance § 17:3-1(a)(17)).
12 81 N.J. at 104, 405 A.2d at 370.
13 /d. at 104, 405 A.2d at 370. Although the judge determined that Baker's household fell
within the meaning of a single non-profit housekeeping unit, lie nevertheless concluded that
Baker was in violation of the numerical restrictions imposed by Plainfield's ordinance. Id.
14 State v. Baker, 158 N.J. Super. 536, 386 A.2d 890 (App. Div. 1978).
15 81 N.J. at 105, 405 A.2d at 370.
16 Id. at 114, 405 A.2d at 375. The court interpreted in combination two provisions of the
New Jersey Constitution: article I, paragraph 1, and article IV, § 6, paragraph 2. Article I,
paragraph I -ensures the natural and unalienable right of individuals to pursue and obtain safety
and happiness." 81 N.J. at 114 n.10, 405 A.2d at 375 n.10. This provision is interpreted as
encompassing the requirement of due process and the right of privacy. Id. at 114 n.10, 405
A.2d at 375 n.10. N.J. CONsr. art. IV, § 6, para. 2 places the power to zone within the police
power of the state. Reading these provisions together. the court concluded that:
zoning restrictions be accomplished in the manner which least impacts upon the
right of individuals to order their lives as thev see fit ....
[Tihe Plainfield regulation fails this test. Thus, it violates the right of privacy and due process.
Id. at 114 n. 10, 405 A. 2d at 375 n. 10.
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Municipal zoning and urban planning emerged in response to the
tremendous growth in population and expansion in urban centers during the 1920s, 1 7 their main purpose being to regulate the physical
uses of land to promote the public welfare. In 1926, the United
States Supreme Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. '8
recognized zoning as a permissible exercise of the states' police
power. 19 Subjecting this power to constitutional limitations, the
Court ruled that any zoning ordinance found to be arbitrary, unreasonable, and unrelated to public health, safety, morals, or general welfare would be found unconstitutional. 20 Two years later, in
Nectow v. City of Cambridge,21 the Supreme Court noted that there
were reasonable limits on the extent of the power of a municipality to

regulate the use of land. 22 Thereafter, 23 and until its 1974 decision
in Village of Belle Terre v.Boraas, 24 the Supreme Court virtually left
the responsibility for defining the legitimate goals of zoning to a
case-by-case interpretation by the state courts. 25
17 See
Is 272
19 Id.
20 Id.

Developments in the Law--Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1433-1442 (1978).
U.S. 365 (1926).
at 386-97.
at 395. To guarantee homogeneity of uses, the concept of Euclidean Zoning arose.

This concept divides areas of land into zones, in which building height, use, and area are
regulated. See 4 N. WILLIAMS. JR., AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW, § 83.01-83.05 (1975).
21 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
22 Id. The Court in ATectoir held that an otherwise valil zoning ordinance may he unconstitutional as applied to a particular piece of property. Id. at 188-89. The ordinance was uncoistitutional as the restriction was harmfil to the owner's interests and not necessary to protect
the health, safety, or general welfare of the citv's inhabitants. Id. at 187-88. See 4 N. WILLIAMS, JR , supra note 20, at § 83.06-83.10.
23 The Supreme Court did not speak again on the subject of zoning until Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26 (1954), in which it broadened its interpretation of zoning to embrace a wide range
of governmental purposes-values [which] are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as
monetary." 1d. at 33. Technically, Berman is not a zoning case as it involved issues of eminent
domain.
24 416 U.S. 1 (1974). The ordinance in Belle Terre limited the number of unrelated individuals who could share a single-family residence. Id. at 2. See note 2 supra. The owners of a
house in the village and the three unrelated college students who had leased the home, challenged the ordinance as violative of equal protection and the ights of association, travel, and
privacy. Id. at 7. Concluding that these rights were not violated, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance. Id. at 7-8.
Prior to Belle Terre, only one federal court had considered the constitutional implications of
a restrictive zoning definition of "family." II Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan, 321 F. Supp.
908 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd, 487 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 910 (1974), the
court sustained the validity of such an ordinance against a constitutional challenge by members
of a commune claiming denial of freedom of association. 321 F. Stipp. at 913. The court
acknowledged that while the right to form such groups receives constitutional recognition, -the
right to insist that these groups live under the same roof, in any part of the city they choose,
[does] not." Id. at 911-12.
25 E.g., Brady v. Superior Court. 200 Cal. App.2d 69, 19 Cal. Rptr. 242 (Dist. Ct. Ap
p.
1962 (judicial interpretation of ordinance leaving the term familY undefined): Carroll v. City of
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In the period following the Supreme Court's acknowledgement of
the power of the states to zone for the public welfare, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey rendered several leading zoning decisions. 26
The most notable was Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v.
lowuship of Mount Laurel (Alt. Laurel),27 in which the court held
that a developing municipality may not zone to exclude low and moderate income housing.28 However, even prior to Mt. Laurel the
New Jersey courts had recognized the need to counteract the
discriminatory impact that some zoning regulations engendered, particularly when residence in a single family dwelling was predicated
upon a biological or legal relationship. 29 For instance, in Kirseh
Holding Compainy v. Borough of Manasquan,30 the court invalidated
an ordinance which restricted the number of unrelated individuals
who could reside together. 31 Although the holding in Kirsch dealt
with seasonal group rental situations, the decision acknowledged a

Miami Beach, 198 So.2d 643 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (legislative intent important in statutory
construction of family). Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962) (upheld
,ordinance prohibiting trailer camps); Lionshead Lake v. Wayne Township, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d
693 (1952) (minimum floor area zoning standards may be justified as necessary to protect the
character of a community); Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970) (zoning ordinance
with primary purpose of preventing newcomers is invalid). See 1 N. \VILLIAMiS, JR., AIERICAN
LAND PLANNING LAW § 3.01 (1974).
26 1 N. WILLIAMS, JR., AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 6.04 (1974). See generally,
Home Builders League v. Tovnship of Berlin, 81 N.J. 127, 408 A.2d 381 (1979) (minimum floor
area requirements were unrelated to legitimate zoning purposes and were invalid exercise of municipal police power); Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d
1192 (1977) (developing community was subject to the non-exclusionary zoning requirements of
the Mount Laurel decision); Berger v. State, 71 N.J. 206, 364 A.2d 993 (1976) (court upheld
municipal immunity against enforcement of zoning ordinance which defined family as two or
more persons related by blood or adoption). Taxpayer's Ass'n v. Weymouth Tp., 80 N.J. 6, 364
A.2d 1016 (1976), appeal dismissed, 430 U.S. 977 (1977) (zoning ordinance which limited use of
mobile homes within trailer park to elderly families was within zoning power delegated to township).
27 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
28 Id. at 174, 336 A.2d at 724. For a discussion of exclusionary zoning, see generally
Mytelka & Mytelka, Exclusionary Zoning: A Consideration of Remedies, 7 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1
(1975).
29 E.g., Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. City of Margate, 112 N.J. Super. 341, 271 A.2d 430
(App. Div. 1970) (seasonal group rental situation in which ordinance defined family along biological or legal criteria or limited to not more than two unrelated persons invalid); Holy Name
Hospital v. Montroy, 153 N.J. Super. 181, 379 A.2d 299 (Law Div. 1977) (ordinance depriving
group of nuns from residing together unconstitutionally restrictive in defining family to mean no
more than three unrelated individuals); Marino v. Mayor and Council, 77 N.J. Super. 587, 187
A.2d 217 (Law Div. 1963) (ordinance which disallowed any unrelated individuals to reside together as single housekeeping unit invalid).
30 59 N.J. 241, 281 A.2d 513 (1971).
:3 Id. at 251-52, 281 A.2d at 518.
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right of unrelated individuals to cohabit 32 The court found the ordinance to be "sweepingly excessive in that it unduly restricted
many harmless uses in an attempt to exclude "unruly unrelated"
groups: 33 it was held invalid as an overly proscriptive violation of due
process. 34
It was not until the decision rendered in State v. Baker that the
Supreme Court of New Jersey struck down a zoning ordinance which
conditioned residence upon a biological or legal relationship as violative of an individual's state constitutional rights of privacy and due
process. 3
The Town of Plainfield asserted that the purpose of the
ordinance was to prevent overcrowding and congestion and to further
a recognized and legitimate goal of zoning-the preservation of a
traditional style of living and of family values. 36 Plainfield further
maintained that its ordinance fell well within the guidelines set down
by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Berger v. State, 3 7 which
adopted as acceptable the concept of restricting single-family homes
to a "reasonable number of persons who constitute a bona fide single
housekeeping unit. "38 The supreme court rejected Plainfield's arguments as insufficient to overcome the ordinance's infringement on
the rights of due process and privacy guaranteed by the New Jersex
State Constitution. 39
While the court recognized that Plainfield's goals were legitimate, it cautioned that the power to attain these goals is "not without
limits."40 In order for a zoning ordinance to be valid, it must both
bear a real and substantial relation to the end sought to be achieved
and be a reasonable use of the state's police power.41 The ordinance's numerical restrictions did not meet this test. 42 Additionally,
classifications based on biological or legal relationships arbitrarily and
needlessly prohibit numerous uses which posit no danger to the effectuation of the desired goals. 43 Recognizing that regulations based on

32 Id.

33 1d.
34 Id.
35 81 N.J. at 113-14, 114 n.10, 405 A.2d at 375, 375 n.10. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
36 81 N.J. at 109, 405 A.2d at 372.
37 71 N.J. 206, 364 A.2d 993 (1976).
38 Id. at 225, 364 A.2d at 1003.
39 81 N.J. at 111-15, 405 A.2d at 373-75. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
40 81 N.J. at 106, 405 A.2d at 370.
41 Id. at 105, 405 A.2d at 370-71.
42 Id. at 106, 405 A.2d at 371. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
41 Id. at 107, 405 A.2d at 371. The court speculated that Plainfield's ordinance would allow
a group of ten distant cousins to reside in a single unit within the municipality but would
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such relationships may house inaccurate assumptions about the stability and social desirability of unrelated individuals residing together,
the court suggested that the goal of preserving a "family" style of

living might be more sensibly attained by a "single-housekeeping
unit" requirement. 44 That is, "[a]s long as a group bears the 'generic
character of a family unit as a relatively permanent household,' it
should be equally as entitled to occupy a single family dwelling as its
biologically related neighbors." ' 45 Such a requirement would eliminate the unnecessary infringement upon the privacy and freedom of
unrelated persons. 46
Plainfield's contention that its ordinance was necessary to pre-

vent overcrowdling and congestion was similarly rejected by the court
as being "too tenuously related to these goals to justify its impinge-

ment upon the internal makeup of the housekeeping entity. "'4 7 In
the court's opinion, the appropriate resolution of the problems of
overcrowding and congestion had already been suggested in Kirsch
Holding Cornpa ny.48 Kirsch observed that such problems could be
relieved through the implementation of area or facility-related ordi-

prohibit five unrelated judges from exercising the same right. The court held such arbitrary
line-drawing intolerable, where less restrictive alternatives exist and more precise means are
available to achieve a legitimate goal. Id. Sec, e.g., Pascack Ass'n v. Mayor & Council, 74 N.J.
470, 483, 379 A.2d 6, 12 (1977); Berger v. State, 71 N.J. at 223-24, 364 A.2d at 1002 (1976);
Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of' Manasquan, 59 N.J. at 251. 281 A.2d at 518 (1971).
44 81 N.J. at 107-08, 405 A.2d at 371-72. In support of its observation, the court referred to
City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 I11. 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116 (1966), in which Justice Schaefer
wrote:
[A] group of persons bound together only by their common desire to operate a
single housekeeping unit, might be thought to have a transient quality that would
[Such] . . . unrelated persons
effect adversely the stability of the neighborhood ....
would be more likely to generate traffic and parking problems than wvould an equal
number of related persons.
But tonc of these observations reflects a universal truth. Family groups are
mobile today, and not all family units are internally stable and well-disciplined.
Family groups with two or more cars are not uifamiliar.
Id. at 108, 405 A.2d at 372 (court's emphasis) (quoting City of' Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 II!.
2d 432, 437-38, 216 N.E. 2d 116, 119 (1966)).
45 81 N.J. at 108-09, 405 A.2d at 372 (quoting City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y. 2d
300, 305, 313 N.E. 2d 756, 758, 357 N.Y. S. 2d 449, 452 (Ct. App. 1974)). The test for a single
housekeeping unit appears to be whether the iidividuals residing within the household share
common areas such as kitchen and eating facilities. 1I N. WILLIAMS, JR., AMERICAN LAND
PLANNING LAW § 52.02 (1974).
46 81 N.J. at 109, 405 A.2d at 372.
41 Id. at 110, 405 A.2d at 373. The court also found the ordiiiance to be "overiiciusive
because it prohibit[ed] single housekeeping units which may not, in fact, be overcrowded or
cause congestion" and "underinclusive because it fail[ed] to prohibit certain housekeeping
units-composed of related individuals-which do present such problems.,, 1I.
48 l(.
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nances. 49 These ordinances could either "limilt] the number of occupants in reasonable relation to available sleeping and bathroom
facilities or requirde] a minimum amount of habitable floor area per
occupant." 50 Ordinances of this nature would provide a more legitimate means to achieve the goal of eliminating overcrowding than
would restrictions based on biological or legal relationships. 51 Thus,
the public health, as well as the integrity of the internal composition
of the household, would be protected. 52
Plainfield's reliance on Belle Terre for further justification of its
ordinance was summarily, but emphatically, rejected by the New Jersey court..3
While recognizing that Belle Terre would be dispositive
of any federal constitutional questions that might be involved, the
court stressed its prerogative to interpret New Jersey's constitution
more stringently. 54 Judging the reasoning of Belle Terre to be "both

unpersuasive and inconsistent" with former decisions adjudicated by
the New Jersey supreme court, the court chose not to follow it. 55
In a lengthy critique, Justice Mountain dissented from the
court's "unfortunate resort to the New Jersey Constitution as a basis
of decision" as well as the impact the majority's decision would have
on zoning. 56 He exalted the status of the biologically or legally related family over the single non-profit housekeeping unit. 7 Justice
Mountain asserted that "[t]he family should be entitled .. .to stand
. .. in a distinctly preferred position. There is no support in our
mores as there should be none in our law, to justify the elevation of
any group of unrelated persons to ... parity with a family." 5 8 Ac-

49 59 N.J. at 254, 281 A.2d at 520.
50

Id.

51 81 N.J. at 110, 405 A.2d at 373.
52 Id. This solution to density-related problems and the appropriateness of imposing such
restrictions was affirmed in Home Builders League v. Township of Berlin, 81 N.J.

127, 405

A.2d 381 (1979).
53 81 N.J. at 111-12, 405 A.2d at 373-74.
5' Id. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
55 81 N.J. at 111-12, 405 A.2d at 373-74. The majority expressly rejected the dissent's contention that their holding in Kirsch had been undermined by the Supreme Court's subsequent
holding in Belle Terre. The majority explained that while the federal aspect of the Kirsch holding was affected by Belle Terre, the state constitutional aspect remained unimpaired. The majority buttressed its reasoning by noting that Berger v. State, which was decided by the New

Jersey supreme court after Belle Terre, specifically endorsed the Kirsch holding. Id.at 112-13,
405 A.2d at 374.
56

Id. at 115, 405 A.2d at 375 (Mountain, J., dissenting).

" Id. at 124, 405 A.2d at 380 (Mountain, J., dissenting). Justice Mountain asserted that the

majority had "denigrated one of the greatest and finest of our institutions-the family." Id.
(Mountain, J., dissenting).
58 Id. (Mountain, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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cordingly, the dissent would have upheld the Plainfield ordinance
rather than deprive homeowners residing in an area zoned for singlefamily dwellings the protections previously enjoyed. 59
Justice Mountain further criticized the majority for its failure to
enunciate why the reasoning of Belle Terre was unpersuasive. 6 He
emphasized the similarity between the ordinances in Belle Terre and
Baker, pointing out that both are essentially identical except that
Plainfield's is more permissive in that it allows four, rather than two,
unrelated individuals to occupy a home.61 The Justice cited other
state court decisions which have confronted this problem subsequent
to the decision in Belle Terre and noted that all have chosen to adopt
the United States Supreme Court's position. 62 Justice Mountain
suggested that the majority could have more appropriately achieved
its result by basing the holding on the statutory interpretation of the
Zoning Enabling Act. 63 This could have been accomplished by finding that the municipality exceeded its delegated authority in defining
family. 64 However, because the court based its decision on constitutional rather than statutory grounds, Justice Mountain observed that
the people of the state have been deprived of an opportunity to enact
corrective legislation. 65
The decision in State v. Baker may be viewed as consonant with
societal changes occurring within family relationships and the further
development of the concept of a single non-profit housekeeping
unit. 66 According to the present law in New Jersey, to permit unrelated individuals to live together in single-family non-profit housekeeping units does not encroach upon the right to have or live as a
family: whereas to disallow unrelated individuals to live together
would impinge upon their state constitutional rights of privacy and
due process.
While the United States Supreme Court sought to maintain
long-standing mores and values by emphasizing the importance of the
60

-81 N.J at 115, 405 A.2d at 375 (Mountain,
dissenting).
Id. at 121-22, 405 A.2d at 379 (Mountain, J.,J.,dissenting).

6' Id. (Mountain, J., dissenting), See notes 2 and 11 supra and accompanying text.

62 81 N.J. at 122, 405 A.2d at 379 (Mountain, J., dissenting). Subsequent to Baker, however, the Supreme Court of California chose not to adopt the position of the United States
Supreme Court in Belle Terre. In City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 126-27,
610 P.2d 436, 439-40, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539, 542-43 (1980) (in bank), the court held as violative of
the state constitutional right of privacy an ordinance which distinguished "between (1) an indi-

vidual or two or more persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption, and (2) groups of more
than five other persons." Id. at 545.
3 81 N.J. at 118, 405 A.2d at 377 (Mountain, J., dissenting).

" Id. (Mountain, J., dissenting).
65 Id. at 120, 405 A.2d at 378 (Mountain, J., dissenting).
6 See generally Note, supra note 8.
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family in Belle Terre, 67 the Supreme Court of New Jersey has recognized that social values are changing, and has now ruled that findamental, individual rights may not be sacrificed in order to protect
these traditional values. 68 Justification for the decision in Baker may
lie in the realization that the New Jersey supreme court is simply
recognizing that the issue presented by Baker is not one of zoning,
but rather a constitutional question of freedom of association. Consequently, New Jersey is construing its state constitution more narrowly than the federal constitution and, therefore, affording its citizens greater protection than that guaranteed under the United States
Constitution. 69 The broad constitutional basis of the court's decision
effectively prohibits municipalities from passing future zoning ordinances using biological or legal relationships to limit the size of
households. Such ordinances would be a per se infringement on an
individual's right to privacy. 70
Although the Baker court did not expressly so provide, one can
infer that the decision is an attempt by the court to alert the
municipalities to the basic recognition that zoning should be limited
to restrictions on the physical uses of land for the public welfare and
should not be utilized for the implementation of social policies.
Viewed from that perspective, the decision rendered in Baker seems
correct. The court did not take a legislative cure away from
municipalities in the field of zoning, nor did it debase the sanctity of
the traditional family. Rather, the opinion is a reflection of the court's
desire to ensure and protect its citizens' constitutional freedoms and
reestablish the basic premise upon which zoning first developed.
Linda Samaiy
67 416 U.S. at 9. The Supreme Court in Belle Terre recognized that the role of the family

transcends zoning. Zoning should be left in the hands of the municipalities and reasonable
restrictions should not be looked upon as deprivations of constitutional rights. See id. at 8.
81 N.J. at 114 n.10, 405 A.2d at 375 n.10. Avoiding the implications of the United States
Supreme Court majority opinion, i.e., that Belle Terre involved no " 'fundamental' " right, 416
U.S. at 7, the New Jersey supreme court implicitly adopted Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in Belle Terre. Compare 81 N.J. at 114 n.10, 405 A.2d at 375 n.10 with 416 U.S. at 12

(Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall contended that the Court should have decided the
controversy on the basis of the conflict between certain basic rights of the tenants. He would
have found that the ordinance violated the tenants' fundamental rights of association and privacy
guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments. 416 U.S. at 13 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

69 See generally Note, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas: "A Sanctuary for People," 9
U.S.F.L. REx'. 391 (1974); Note, Village of Belle Terre is a Nice Place to Visit-But Only
Families May live There, 8 URB. L. ANN. 193 (1974). See also Brennan, State Constitutions and
the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977).
70 81 N.J. at 113-15, 405 A.2d at 375. The court stated that "zoning regulations which

attempt to limit residency based upon the number of unrelated individuals present in a single
non-profit housekeeping unit cannot pass constitutional muster." Id. at 113, 405 A.2d at 375.

